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When channelled into policies, resource nationalism can provide jurisdictions 
with the ability to maximize the benefits of resource exploitation. Since the 
earliest days of responsible government in the 1850s Newfoundland polit-
icians have pursued a number of resource-driven projects to further develop 
the economic and social well-being of their citizens (and sometimes, them-
selves) under bombastic catchphrases such as “develop or perish,” “burn your 
boats,” and “no more giveaways” (Thomsen, 2010: 134). While there have been 
notable writings on Newfoundland nationalism generally (see Vezina and 
Basha, 2014; Marland, 2010; Cadigan, 2009; Hiller, 1987; overton, 1979), little 
attention has been paid to a comparative assessment of resource nationalism 
in the province, particularly between different administrations. This essay 
attempts to rectify this oversight.1 In doing so it improves our understanding 
of the role resource nationalism plays in a sub-state jurisdiction by examining 
the policy prescriptions and actions of two provincial administrations — Pro-
gressive Conservative (PC) Premiers Brian Peckford (1979–89) and danny 
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Williams (2003–10) — as they attempted to wrest benefits from offshore oil 
development. 
There is, notably, a 14-year gap between these two governments, a gap that 
was largely presided over by the Liberal premierships of Clyde Wells (1989–96) 
and Brian tobin (1996–2000). While it is certainly true that both Wells and 
tobin were involved in high-profile battles — in the case of Wells, with his 
federal counterparts, and in the case of tobin, with major companies and for-
eign powers — neither Premier pursued a resource nationalist approach con-
cerning oil. This can largely be explained by the low price of oil during the 
period, the unavailability — until November 1997 — of an operating oil field 
(Hibernia), and a constant preoccupation with the collapse of the cod fishery. 
While numerous post-Confederation premiers have adopted resource nation-
alist stances in other sectors, including fishing, mining, and hydro development, 
resource nationalism has been most prominent in the move to derive benefits 
from the offshore oil sector. 
By focusing on Newfoundland’s experience with resource nationalism in 
the offshore oil sector this article contributes to the qualitative theoretical de-
bate twofold; first, by analyzing a small, developed sub-jurisdiction this article 
adds to the comparative case studies on resource nationalism that often are 
focused on the Middle east, Latin America, and the former Soviet union. 
Second, in the Canadian context, what little scholarly work has been done on 
resource nationalism is Alberta- and Quebec-centric (see Goldstein, 1981; 
Bradbury, 1982). This essay reorients the debate to one of Canada’s smaller 
provinces, providing another useful comparison on the role resource national-
ism plays in federal–provincial relations.
our analysis will first provide a short theoretical overview of resource 
nationalism. That summary will be followed by a brief explanation of New-
foundland nationalism with a particular focus on the historical factors that 
have fashioned nationalism in the province and on how numerous govern-
ments have used nationalist policies to diversify the local economy. Following 
that are the two case studies: the Peckford and Williams administrations. 
Those sections will highlight the resource nationalist actions and policy pre-
scriptions taken by each leader towards obtaining a greater portion of the rents 
from both the federal government and, in the case of Williams, from interna-
tional oil companies in the province’s offshore oil industry. Finally, this paper 
will conclude with how the province’s experiences with this most recent bout 
of resource nationalism compares and contrasts with the theory. 
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ReSouRCe NAtIoNALISM
While governments have been claiming control over resources since Roman 
times, “resource nationalism” is a much more contemporary concept, tracing 
its roots to mid-nineteenth-century economic nationalism (Helleiner, 2002: 
309; Bond, McCrone, and Brown, 2003: 371; Ross, 2012: 33). That being said, 
resource nationalism emerged as an ideology in its own right only in the two 
decades following World War II (Helleiner, 2002: 309). Influenced by the com-
bination of Keynesian economic thinking, the perceived economic success of 
state-owned corporations in the Soviet union, and the “conceptualization of 
market failure,” resource nationalism became adopted as a form of state eco-
nomic policy in both developed and developing countries in the 1960s and 
1970s (domjan and Stone, 2010: 38; Stevens, 2008: 7; Ross, 2012: 39).2
The general idea driving resource nationalism is the fixation on con-
trolling and exploiting natural resources; yet, the term remains contested, fre-
quently used but lacking a universally accepted definition. Nevertheless, a 
brief literature review can extrapolate a succinct understanding of what the 
term implies. At its most basic, resource nationalism is closely allied with 
economic nationalism. As Robert Gilpin notes, economic nationalism refers 
to those “economic activities [that] are and should be subordinate to the goal 
of state-building and the interests of the state” (Gilpin, 1987: 31; see also Hel-
leiner, 2002: 309). Within that framework one can place resource nationalism, 
a concept that articulates the view that “the natural resources in the ground 
or under the sea are the property of the nation rather than of a firm or indi-
vidual who owns the surface area” (Mares, 2010: 6). In effect, resource nation-
alism views natural resources as representing a “national patrimony” that 
“should be used for the benefit of the nation rather than for private gain” 
(Mares, 2010: 6). Resource nationalism posits that territories with an abun-
dance of a particular natural resource should use their “legal jurisdiction over 
these resources to achieve some set of national goals that would otherwise 
not [be] obtain[ed] if their exploitation were left to international market pro-
cesses” (Wilson, 2010: 3). 
differences, however, emerge over what policy prescriptions are implied in 
resource nationalism. Bremmer and Johnston (2009: 149) argue that propo-
nents of resource nationalism are more concerned about shifting political and 
economic control of natural resources from private and foreign companies to 
state-owned enterprises. Stevens contends that we need to examine the range of 
elite-actor motives behind resource nationalist policies to ascertain an explicit 
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understanding of what the term references. For him, resource nationalism can 
be defined by two core components: (1) limiting the involvement of major in-
ternational businesses; and (2) “asserting a greater national control over natural 
resource development” (Stevens, 2008: 5–6). Thus, resource nationalism “en-
compasses both the reassertion of state control prior to the end of the construc-
tion phase of a development and the outright exclusion of foreign participation” 
(domjam and Stone, 2010: 38). However, resource nationalism need not be ex-
clusively defined by those policies that lead to total nationalization of a resource 
industry; it can also include policies that derive more financial benefit from the 
privately managed resource. 
Consequently, for many resource-rich states there continually exists public 
pressure to garner better development benefits through state interventionist 
policies (Wilson, 2010: 3). In this context, Wilson has noted that, generally, 
four policy goals underpin resource nationalism: (1) capturing more revenue 
“by mandating increases in the traded prices of commodities”; (2) capturing 
more revenue by demanding a stake in the exploitation; (3) mandating the es-
tablishment of local resource processing and manufacturing through contractual 
negotiations with foreign corporations; (4) and obtaining “(non-resource related) 
concessions from customer states, through the use of various forms of ‘resource 
diplomacy’” (Wilson, 2010: 4). These goals can be divided into fiscal and eco-
nomic rationales (see table 1). Fiscal policy goals are focused on obtaining 
more direct cash into the treasury while economic goals are more concerned 
about jobs and other indirect benefits. of course, the common thread under-
lining each goal is to derive more benefits out of the resource exploitation than 
would have been possible had there been no intervention. 
Table 1. Four Policy Goals of Resource Nationalism
Fiscal 
Rationales
Mandating increases in traded commodity prices
Demanding a stake in the exploitation 
Economic 
Rationales
Mandating the establishment of local resource processing 
Obtaining concessions from customer states
Source: Wilson (2010).
These goals, in turn, can be classified into four approaches: (1) “evolutionary 
resource nationalism”; (2) “economic resource nationalism”; (3) “legacy resource 
nationalism”; and (4) “soft resource nationalism” (Bremmer and Johnston, 2009: 
150–51; see table 2). The first, revolutionary resource nationalism, occurs during 
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times of political upheaval (e.g., Vladimir Putin’s renationalization of the oil and 
gas sector in Russia). It usually leads to the forced renegotiation of contracts un-
der the rhetoric of “historical injustice or alleged environmental or contractual 
misdeeds by . . . companies” (Bremmer and Johnston, 2009: 150). There is often 
zero compensation or recourse of action for those companies affected.
economic resource nationalism is less concerned about total state control. 
Rather, economic resource nationalist policies remain focused on increasing 
the state’s share of the rents, either through operating state-owned resource 
companies or through obtaining a larger share of the private sector’s revenues 
using legislative means (e.g., Algeria). often done arbitrarily, the ultimate out-
come is a greater share of the revenues, not so much controlling the resource. 
Third, legacy resource nationalism occurs in jurisdictions where the resource 
is “central to national political and cultural identity” (Bremmer and Johnston, 
2009: 151). States with legacy resource nationalist policies will place the re-
source under the control of a state-owned enterprise. The final variant, soft 
resource nationalism, is found most often in developed countries (e.g., Austra-
lia and the uK). today, there is little in the way of state-owned resource com-
panies in such countries; however, fiscal policies in the form of taxation and 
royalties are implemented to extract a percentage of the rents. These national-
ist policies, unlike economic resource nationalism, are not done arbitrarily but 
through established legislative and regulatory frameworks (Bremmer and 
Johnston, 2009: 152). Moreover, even when the rare forced renegotiation oc-
curs, it still is subject to regulatory, legislative, and legal review (i.e., there is a 
recourse of action for the affected companies). 
Table 2. Resource Nationalist Approaches
Revolutionary
(e.g., Russia, Venezuela)
occurs during times of political upheaval
nationalization and forced renegotiation of contracts with no compensation
Economic
(e.g., Algeria)
greater share of the rents but not total state control
often arbitrary
Legacy
(e.g., Kuwait, Mexico)
state-controlled resource extraction
result of cultural factors cementing the resource as key to national identity
Soft
(e.g., Australia, U.K.)
use of taxation and royalties to extract rents
done through legislative framework, not arbitrary
Source: Bremmer and Johnston (2009).
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The strengths and weaknesses of resource nationalist policies, especially as 
they relate to oil, also have been well documented. As the 1973 oPeC crisis 
demonstrated, an increase in the price of a strategic commodity like oil can 
alter the bargaining power between states and industry (Ross, 2012; Vivoda, 
2009; Bremmer and Johnston, 2009: 155–57). When prices are high there is 
said to be “disharmony” between governments and industry; consequently, 
“host governments rethink their contracts and seek higher taxes and royalties” 
(Vivoda, 2009: 517–18). during these times resource nationalism, in popular 
sentiment and in government rhetoric, is on the upswing. However, the corol-
lary also is true; when prices are low governments are more willing to concede 
a larger share of the rents in exchange for industry investing in developing the 
resource. In such situations, resource nationalist feeling is suppressed and gov-
ernment-industry interactions are characterised as “co-operative” (Vivoda, 
2009: 521). Such co-operation was quite apparent in numerous jurisdictions 
during the late 1980s and 1990s when oil prices were at record lows, including 
in Newfoundland. Vivoda (2009: 519) further contends that the lack of re-
source nationalist policies globally during those two decades can be explained 
by three factors that are prescient even today: (1) states over-reliant on oil be-
came desperate for more foreign investment when prices were low; (2) inter-
national oil companies, with a near-monopoly on technological sophistication 
and managerial competence, faced little or no competition from state-owned 
industries; (3) and private oil companies had other investment alternatives 
should they be denied a favourable domestic revenue-making environment. 
In light of the above, the cyclical nature of commodity prices also high-
lights the dangers in resource nationalist interventionism. When it comes to 
earning oil revenues during a time of high prices, for example, governments 
will often cut taxes. The downside is that by removing a stable form of earning 
revenue, government finances become dependent on a volatile commodity 
over whose price they have little control. For example, in 2008 the Venezuelan 
government spent at the rate of $75 a barrel but had based its budget estimates 
on oil trading at $35 a barrel. It had become politically unfeasible to derive 
other forms of revenues and thus the country became financially vulnerable 
(Bremmer and Johnston, 2009: 152). The Venezuelan case speaks to another 
truism: short-term resource nationalist policies are popular and politically sell-
able but can carry long-term risk. Still, they can make good economic sense if 
the population in question has gone through a period of heavy taxation or 
when public infrastructure and services require large, quick injections of cash 
(Ross, 2012: 31–33; see also Karl, 1997). Not surprisingly, the influx of oil 
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revenues has also been noted to foster larger government bureaucracies. It has 
been estimated that, on average, the governments of oil-dependent states are 45 
per cent larger than non-oil-dependent states (Ross, 2012: 29). 
Some resource nationalist policies also carry the risk that they can deny 
governments access to the necessary foreign expertise and investment to “ex-
pand, or even sustain, the output and revenue streams they need for long-term 
survival” (Bremmer and Johnston, 2009: 152). Thus, while they are often the 
main focal point of consternation behind the very pursuit of resource national-
ist policies, the same major international businesses remain the experts in the 
technological complexities of resource extraction and management. Such exper-
tise, of course, is needed to ensure efficient and productive extraction. Likewise, 
resource nationalism can often delay projects as whatever leverage govern-
ments may think they have during times of high prices belie the fact that large 
resource companies operate in a global marketplace. delays in one jurisdiction 
can often translate into industry shifting focus to extraction in another, as Vivoda 
notes. This was most evident in the 1970s when a rash of nationalizations in 
oPeC countries saw private industry shift to oil exploration and production in 
the North Sea and Alaska (Bremmer and Johnston, 2009: 155). 
NeWFouNdLANd NAtIoNALISM
A resource nationalist critique of Newfoundland is apt in consideration of island 
nationalists’ long-held goal to both exercise control and obtain benefits from 
natural resource exploitation (overton, 1979: 226; Hiller, 1987; Bannister, 2003). 
to understand the role of resource nationalism in Newfoundland politics over 
the last 30 years one must first understand the currents of history that flow 
through Newfoundland nationalism. Newfoundland’s historical evolution as a 
self-governing territory has seen its identity characterized by two constants: (1) 
its political leaders frequently articulate a belief that the nation’s future is tied to 
the ability to exploit its natural resources; and (2) these same leaders lack the 
ability to control such resources or at the very least to provide policy guidance 
on how to accrue some of the financial benefits. Though conscious of the fact 
that Newfoundland governments were perpetually negotiating from “a position 
of weakness,” the inability to have such control has become a common refrain 
in explaining Newfoundland’s economic backwardness (McAllister, 1982: 123). 
Importantly, this thinking fuelled the notion that the nation’s economic struggles 
were the responsibility of outsiders, which in the pre-Confederation period 
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meant fishing merchants, the government of Canada, and such foreign powers 
as France (Hiller, 2007: 116; Bannister, 2003: 147). In the case of oil and gas 
development in the post-Confederation period this blame would shift to ottawa 
and international oil companies. For Newfoundland citizens, this “version of 
events” fostered an image of a people who had been “the victims of a hostile 
imperial policy that was antithetical to the establishment of a settled colonial 
society, which had emerged nevertheless thanks to the efforts of the hardy and 
resilient settlers” (Hiller, 2007: 117; see also Bannister, 2003: 147).
Cognizant of running a thinly populated country whose people remained 
scattered among hundreds of coastal villages and overly reliant on one resource 
— the fishery — Newfoundland nationalists became fixated on devising poli-
cies to diversify the local economy. This effort was most pronounced with the 
building of the railway during the 1881–98 period (overton, 1979: 221–22; 
Korneski, 2008). The impetus behind this nationalism was largely “economic 
development . . . [with] the nation state as the main building block” (overton, 
1979: 222). The nationalist cause was further bolstered in the early twentieth 
century by the populist leadership of Prime Minister Sir Robert Bond. Associ-
ated with a period when Newfoundland was relatively prosperous, Bond has 
long been mythologized for having “stood up for Newfoundland” against 
ottawa, London, and big business — a trait Newfoundlanders expect in their 
leaders today (Hiller, 2007: 121).
Since Confederation in 1949, and with the exception of a dispute with 
Canadian Prime Minister John diefenbaker over federal transfers 10 years lat-
er, Newfoundland nationalism remained largely dormant during most of Lib-
eral Premier Joseph Smallwood’s 22 years in power. Nevertheless, the earliest 
signs of a re-emergence in nationalist sentiment began late in the 1960s. de-
spite Smallwood’s rhetoric of Confederation being a great “gift” to the province, 
after the post-Confederation construction boom began to wind down in the 
mid-1960s Newfoundland began an economic slide that carried into the 1970s 
(Gwyn, 1972; Horwood, 1989; Cadigan, 2009a). As a result, the provincial 
treasury became more dependent on federal transfer payments. Combined 
with a growing intolerance of Smallwood’s leadership, this dependence was 
particularly resented by the new, urban middle class, who were benefactors, 
ironically, of Smallwood’s establishment of Memorial university in 1949 and of 
the increase in the standard of living brought about by federal social programs 
and infrastructure investment (overton, 1979: 227; Hiller, 1987; Hiller, 2007: 
130; Cadigan, 2009b: 41). This period also witnessed a cultural revival in the 
province — particularly in the urban areas — with theatre groups like CodCo 
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stressing the province’s distinctiveness and the need to protect its songs, cus-
toms, and dialects (o’dea, 2003: 378; Hiller, 2007: 130; Cadigan, 2009b: 41). 
Notwithstanding these changes, Newfoundland nationalism has not verged 
into outright secessionist sentiment — a point worth remembering (Thomsen, 
2010; Vezina and Basta, 2014). 
Coinciding with these cultural, social, and economic changes was the 
1969 agreement to build one of the world’s largest hydroelectric facilities: in 
Labrador, at Churchill Falls. operating under the rubric of “develop or perish” 
(incidentally, the same phrase used in pre-Confederation times for resource 
development), Newfoundland entered into a deal with the province of Quebec 
and a coalition of international business interests to develop the Churchill 
Falls dam (Horwood, 1989; Marland, 2010). The aim of the project, outside of 
the immediate construction jobs, was to place the province as a strategic 
supplier of electricity to the eastern united States. Instead, through the mach-
inations of federal–provincial politics at the time, Quebec support for the proj-
ect was essential and it co-operated only on the condition that the power be 
sold to its provincial energy utility, Hydro-Québec, at exceptionally low prices 
until 2041 (Churchill, 1999; Feehan and Baker, 2007; Marland, 2010: 161; 
Feehan, 2011a). unfortunately for Newfoundland, Hydro-Québec continues 
to reap the gains from that project due to its access to almost all the electricity 
for which it pays an incredibly low price. By the early 1970s, particularly after 
the oPeC crisis, it had become clear that Smallwood’s Churchill Falls deal 
amounted to a major “giveaway” of a valuable “national” natural resource. to 
the urban middle class, in historian Sean Cadigan’s words, the deal “became 
symbolic of Newfoundland’s weak position within Confederation” (2009b: 
40–41). More importantly, the Churchill Falls deal became a focal point for 
stimulating the resource nationalist drive among the wider public, leading to 
calls for both greater provincial control over natural resources and a larger 
share of the rents. Churchill Falls and the phrase “no more giveaways” would 
become the rallying cry of succeeding generations. And it would shape the 
future governments of Premiers Peckford and Williams in their quest to obtain 
better “deals” over the province’s new-found oil wealth (Hiller, 2007: 130–31; 
Cadigan, 2009b: 41; Bannister, 2012: 212–13).
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tHe PeCKFoRd yeARS (1979–89)
unfortunately for Newfoundland’s premiers, the first sign of potential oil de-
posits off Newfoundland occurred in the late 1960s, around the same time that 
the Supreme Court of Canada ruled offshore petroleum development to be a 
federal prerogative (Plourde, 2012: 100).3 tellingly, then Premier Joey Small-
wood claimed provincial jurisdiction over offshore resources, laying the foun-
dation for future clashes between the province and ottawa. Smallwood at one 
point dispatched a deep-sea diver to walk the floor of the Grand Banks and 
claim ownership of the offshore resources, but this was as far as he would go in 
advancing the province’s claim (House, 1985: 55). With the change of govern-
ment in the 1970s, prior to any commercial discovery off Newfoundland, a 
small group of advisers in the provincial department of Mines and energy 
designed a petroleum development policy based on the Norwegian state inter-
vention approach to oil extraction. Among this group were departmental legal 
adviser Cabot Martin, the assistant deputy minister, Steve Millan, and eco-
nomic consultant Pedro van Meurs (House, 1985: 47–48). Led by their minis-
ter, Brian Peckford, these individuals set out to establish resource nationalist 
policies that would promote “development through regaining control and 
through good management of the major resource industries,” of which oil was 
the most prominent (House, 1985: 48). Their overarching goal was threefold: 
(1) achieve provincial autonomy; (2) preserve the rural way of life and culture; 
and (3) achieve the first two goals by adopting “a controlled approach to re-
source exploitation and development” (House, 1985: 44; Thomsen, 2010: 130).
Their first move was to create the province’s own petroleum legislation and 
regulations, An Act Respecting Petroleum and Natural Gas, in 1977, with cor-
responding regulations produced in 1978 (House, 1985: 49–50). oil companies 
initially halted exploratory drilling in protest but returned to operations the 
following year (Higgins, 2011). Notably, these regulations were a direct applica-
tion of the North Sea oil development model used by the Norwegians and 
advanced in the 1960s (House, 1985: 56), a position later endorsed by the eco-
nomic Council of Canada in its 1980 study of Newfoundland (McAllister, 1982: 
127). embedded within the regulations were seven policy goals:
1. obtain the biggest portion of the economic rents for the province.
2. establish Newfoundland as an active participant in developing off-
shore petroleum through the use of a Crown agency, the Newfound-
land Petroleum Corporation.
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3. Give local businesses first right of refusal on oil supplies and servicing 
contracts.
4. ensure that oil companies give Newfoundlanders a preference in 
hiring.
5. Require the expenditure of a certain amount of corporate budgets on 
training, education, and research.
6. ensure that Newfoundland’s petroleum needs are met during allocation.
7. See to it that any and all oil developments must minimize “adverse 
impacts upon local communities” (House, 1985: 50).
The following year, 1979, would prove a turning point in the pursuit of re-
source nationalism in Newfoundland. With the resignation of Frank Moores 
that March, Peckford became Premier, the Hibernia oil field was discovered, oil 
prices climbed rapidly, and the province was beset by both a national and inter-
national recession (Thomsen, 2010: 137). With the Hibernia discovery there 
was finally a real possibility of commercial development. The problem for Peck-
ford was the dual constraint of having to contend with a centralizing Prime 
Minister, Pierre trudeau, and the federal claim to jurisdiction over offshore re-
sources, reinforced by the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision. Initially, there was 
some respite on the first charge as trudeau’s defeat in the federal election of 
1979 brought in a young Progressive Conservative Prime Minister, Joe Clark. 
An Albertan, Clark promised to treat offshore resources the same as those on 
land (as they were in his home province), effectively giving Peckford what he 
wanted. This hope was dashed with the defeat of the Clark government in Feb-
ruary 1980. The return of the Liberals under Prime Minister trudeau signalled 
a period of bitter public bargaining and political manoeuvring, especially when 
ottawa passed Bill C-48 in 1981 to create the National energy Program on the 
presumptive basis that offshore resources were under federal control (House, 
1985: 56–57). Moreover, the political battling between the two governments sti-
fled investment in the offshore as businesses hesitated to spend large sums of 
money in such an uncertain climate. The ripple effect of the jurisdictional dis-
putes prolonged the date when oil could actually be extracted (Plourde, 2012: 
101). Nevertheless, three months after the 1980 federal election, the first round 
of talks between Newfoundland’s new energy Minister, Leo Barry, and his fed-
eral counterpart, Marc Lalonde, ended in failure. during January and February 
of 1981 talks resumed but failed again. Barry resigned and his replacement as 
provincial energy Minister, William Marshall, met with Lalonde in october of 
that year but they were not able to reach an agreement, and despite attempts by 
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the province to continue the discussion they were receiving no response from 
the federal government on new proposals.
during this period, 1979–83, Peckford’s rhetoric consistently reflected a re-
source nationalist theme, mimicking the tensions between St. John’s and ottawa, 
and reflecting the goals outlined in his legislation. The 1979 Throne Speech, the 
first for Peckford as Premier, declared that “our ownership of and control over 
our offshore oil and gas resources must be beyond question” (cited in Thomsen, 
2010: 136). The 1982 Throne Speech cited offshore petroleum deposits as New-
foundland’s “birthright” and that the province needed to “seize the resources” 
from ottawa in order to prosper (Thomsen, 2010: 137–38). even the 1982 PC 
Party election slogan tried to capture the sentiment that control over offshore oil 
was the path to prosperity when it ran under the headline of “Have Not Will Be 
No More” (this slogan also became the title of Peckford’s memoirs). More explicit 
was Peckford’s 1983 manifesto, whereby he proclaimed that:
ottawa’s promises of revenues and spin offs do not take into account 
our determination to use this non-renewable resource to build a dis-
tinct and vibrant society rooted in our renewable resources of fish 
and timber. . . . Are we to be denied that opportunity because we 
came late to Canada, or because we did not discover our resource 
potential before Mr. trudeau grew tired of negotiating with provin-
cial governments? (Thomsen, 2010: 136)
This is not to say that ottawa was unhelpful. offshore oil-drilling subsidies 
under the National energy Program in many ways encouraged oil companies 
to maintain exploratory drilling during a time of depressed oil prices (Reid 
and Collins, 2013).
Peckford went out of his way to capitalize on and to mobilize public senti-
ment around his position. He created a new provincial flag, adopted the 
pre-Confederation national anthem — “The ode to Newfoundland” — as the 
province’s anthem, poured money into arts and culture programs, and even 
called a snap election in April 1982, asking for a mandate to negotiate with 
ottawa. He won an overwhelming victory with 44 of the 52 seats in the provin-
cial legislature. However, the federal government seemed to be unimpressed by 
Peckford’s electoral success, and on 19 May 1982 announced that it would take 
the ownership issue to the Supreme Court of Canada. In response, Peckford 
had the Supreme Court of Newfoundland similarly examine the jurisdictional 
issue. The province’s case rested on terms 7 and 37 of the terms of union, the 
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document that proscribed Newfoundland’s transition from a dominion to a 
Canadian province in 1949 (House, 1985: 58–59; see also Collins, 2012). In 
short, the province argued that as Newfoundland’s legal status as a self-governing 
dominion was recognized in term 7, and that term 37 allocated mineral rights 
and royalties to the province, then Newfoundland held ownership over off-
shore resources. In February 1983, the Newfoundland court responded that 
while Newfoundland was “not a province like all the rest” and that it was a 
self-governing dominion equal to Canada in international law before 1949, it 
could not go against the national court’s earlier rulings on the federal right to 
control offshore resources (House, 1985: 58–59; Plourde, 2012: 101). In March 
1984, the Supreme Court of Canada made its ruling that the sub-sea resources 
off Newfoundland belonged to Canada (Feehan, 2009: 176). In response, Peck-
ford declared a provincial day of mourning and encouraged everyone in the 
province to wear black armbands — a position not unlike Smallwood’s three 
days of mourning and flags-at-half-mast actions in 1959 over term 29 funding 
(Cadigan, 2009a; Bannister, 2012; Vezina and Basta, 2014). He promptly set out 
on a national tour for a “fair deal” with the rest of Canada (House, 1985: 60).
While the Peckford government was dealing with the trudeau Liberals and 
the consequences of the Supreme Court decision, other events were occurring 
that would change matters considerably. Brian Mulroney won the leadership of 
the federal Progressive Conservative Party in June 1984. He and Peckford met 
soon after and reached a settlement on a proposed Atlantic Accord should Mul-
roney win the next election. This accommodating mood may have developed 
based on the crucial support given by both Peckford and third-place leadership 
contender John Crosbie of Newfoundland to Mulroney on the final ballot of the 
recent leadership convention (Crosbie, 1997; see also Mulroney, 2007: 248). In 
short, Mulroney promised that Newfoundland would be the principal benefi-
ciary of oil development; that there would be joint management with ottawa of 
offshore petroleum; that the province could collect resource revenues as if they 
were on land; and that equalization payments would continue for a period of 
time once oil revenues started to come in (House, 1985: 60).
on 4 September 1984 Mulroney led the tories to a huge electoral victory. 
two months later provincial energy Minister Marshall met the new federal 
energy Minister, Pat Carney, to work on the details of the Accord. The pre- 
development round of the dispute between the federal and provincial 
governments was resolved on 11 February 1985 when Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney and Premier Brian Peckford signed the Atlantic Accord. As per the 
original pre-election agreement, the Accord gave both governments equal 
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partnership in the management of offshore oil and gas resources and gave the 
province access to revenues — in the form of royalties, corporate taxes, and 
provincial taxes — from offshore development similar to those received by 
provinces from land-based oil and gas (Feehan, 2009: 177; Bickerton, 2008: 
101). In terms of equalization payments, the Accord allowed for a transition 
period of 12 years during which offset payments would be allocated to the 
province as compensation for any oil revenues loss in the equalization formula. 
This component of the Accord would take place once Hibernia’s “cumulative 
production had reached a specified threshold” (Feehan, 2009: 178). The federal 
government would reach a similar agreement with Nova Scotia in 1986. Much 
of the 1977 regulations became either disavowed or folded into the new joint 
management board, the Canada–Newfoundland offshore Petroleum Board.4 
While hardly the autonomist vision Peckford initially wanted, this arrange-
ment between the two levels of government cleared the way for the signing of 
an agreement with the consortium of companies in 1990 to proceed with the 
development of the Hibernia oil field.
tHe WILLIAMS yeARS (2003–2010)
Much like Brian Peckford’s policies, the foundations of danny Williams’s re-
source nationalist policies were rooted in the province’s poor fiscal health and 
a sense that Newfoundland was being shortchanged on offshore oil revenues. 
even before he took office in the fall of 2003, Williams, as leader of the PC 
Party, was running on a theme of “No More Giveaways” (Vezina and Basta, 
2014). This similarity was particularly acute when, in 2002, he criticized Liberal 
Premier Roger Grimes’s Voisey’s Bay nickel deal with mining giant Inco as 
being unbeneficial (Koop, 2014). However, and despite the fact that Hibernia 
was producing oil when Williams came to office in 2003, the prevalence of 
extremely low oil prices meant that very few benefits were coming into the 
provincial treasury. In his first year in office Williams was faced with a severe 
fiscal situation, the province’s per capita debt and debt-to-GdP ratio being 
among the worst in the country (Bickerton, 2002: 294). In a live television 
address to the province, the new Premier announced wage freezes for public 
employees and program cuts (Feehan, 2011b: 51). That same year the Royal 
Commission on Renewing and Strengthening our Place in Canada, a creation 
of the previous Liberal administration of Roger Grimes, released its final re-
port examining the province’s status in Canada. A key component of the 
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Commission’s findings was the need to maximize Newfoundland’s share of off-
shore oil revenues, which it claimed were being lost to equalization “clawbacks” 
(Bickerton, 2002: 290; Feehan, 2011b: 51). 
designed in the 1950s and enshrined in section 36 of the Constitution Act, 
1982, the equalization program commits the federal government to make 
payments to fiscally weak provincial governments so that each province has 
“sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services 
to all Canadians at reasonably comparable levels of taxation” (Bickerton, 2008: 
100–01). The program was critical for the Newfoundland treasury, account-
ing for 25 to 33 per cent of all government revenues between 1967 and 2003 
(Bickerton, 2002: 294). Suffice it to say, while the 1985 Atlantic Accord had 
promised to make Newfoundland the principal beneficiary of oil revenues, the 
design of the equalization program at the time meant that in practice the New-
foundland government’s equalization grant would decline by about 70 cents 
for each dollar of offshore oil revenue it received. The 12-year transition period 
of equalization offsets outlined in the Accord had already started in 1999–2000 
amid a period of low oil prices (Feehan, 2009: 178). The Commission concluded 
that the Accord was inhibiting the province from gaining the most benefits 
from offshore oil, especially with two oil fields coming on stream in addition 
to Hibernia: terra Nova and White Rose. taking a long-term perspective the 
Commission determined that the federal government would accrue 76.7 per 
cent of the oil fields’ tax revenues, compared to Newfoundland’s 23.4 per cent 
(Feehan, 2009: 179). With austerity measures on the horizon the Williams 
administration became determined to put the Commission’s recommendation 
into action and accrue 100 per cent of the clawback oil revenues from the 
federal government — without any loss of equalization payments over the life 
of the oil fields.
Possibly due to the prospect of the federal Liberals obtaining a minority 
government in the June 2004 federal election, Williams was able to get Liberal 
Prime Minister Paul Martin, during a campaign stop in St. John’s, to agree to 
the demand of not including oil revenues in equalization calculations over the 
life of the oil fields (Feehan, 2011b: 51). However, resistance from ontario and 
the federal bureaucracy led to a prolonged delay in responding to Williams’s 
proposal upon Martin’s return to the Prime Minister’s office that summer 
(Feehan, 2011b: 52). It would take until october 2004, at a First Ministers’ 
Conference, during which the Prime Minister announced major changes to 
the equalization formula — with the federal government still claiming “70 
cents in equalization for every dollar earned in offshore energy revenues” — that 
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Williams made a great public spectacle, storming out of the meeting claiming 
Martin had broken his promise (Feehan, 2011b: 51–52; Library of Parliament, 
2006: 10; Smith, 2005: 19–20). 
The back-and-forth exchanges continued until two days before Christmas 
day 2004, when Williams ordered the taking down of all Canadian flags on 
provincial buildings (Feehan, 2011b: 51–52). This move, akin to Peckford’s 
“day of mourning” actions two decades earlier, proved highly popular in New-
foundland. By January, with the flags having returned to the poles and the 
public clearly backing him, Williams and Martin agreed to a new offset Agree-
ment, complementing the original Atlantic Accord. Specifically, ottawa agreed 
to compensate Newfoundland for 100 per cent of oil revenues lost as a result of 
clawbacks up to 2011–12, one year beyond the end of the original 12-year tran-
sition period outlined in the 1985 Accord. The province would receive a $2 
billion up-front “pre-payment” for the anticipated clawback money ending in 
2011–12 (Feehan, 2011b: 52). Should Newfoundland qualify for equalization 
in 2011–12, and its “debt-servicing charges remain high,” an eight-year renewal 
agreement would kick in, providing 100 per cent compensation on offshore 
revenues through to 2019–20 (Library of Parliament, 2006: 10; Smith, 2005: 
20). Nova Scotia also received an identical offset Agreement for its offshore 
natural gas industry. But Williams did not get all he wanted. As a Library of 
Parliament study (2006: 10) on the agreement remarked, there was no alter-
ation to the equalization formula and there would be no compensation of rev-
enues for the life of the oil fields. Still, with oil prices climbing, the provincial 
treasury soon became flush with cash.
Williams would try to repeat his success against newly elected Conserva-
tive Prime Minister Stephen Harper in 2007. In the 2006 federal election that 
unseated Paul Martin, Harper had promised Williams that he would not in-
clude natural resources in the equalization formula. But in 2006, the report of 
expert Panel on equalization and territorial Formula Financing, otherwise 
known as the o’Brien Report, commissioned under the previous federal Liberal 
government, recommended that 50 per cent of all natural resource revenue be 
included in equalization calculations and that equalization payments be 
capped so that a recipient province’s fiscal capacity did not exceed that of 
ontario (then, the lowest non-receiving province). Harper’s 2007 budget im-
plemented many of the report’s key recommendations, “which effectively 
killed the federal commitment in the Atlantic Accords to delink the offshore 
oil and gas revenues of Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia from 
their equalization entitlements” (Bickerton, 2008: 102; see also Feehan, 2009: 
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176). While Nova Scotia reached an alternative arrangement in light of these 
changes, danny Williams refused; although with ottawa receiving four times 
the revenue from Hibernia that Newfoundland got ($4.8 billion to $1.2 billion) 
that year, Williams’s indignation was largely justified (Bickerton, 2008: 103). 
The Premier immediately took to targeting Harper in speeches, demanding 
that the Prime Minister’s promise be kept. In october 2007 the province went 
to the polls again. In a move that was highly reminiscent of Brian Peckford’s 
1982 election campaign, Williams pitched himself as defender of the province’s 
interests (Koop, 2014). The PC Party’s platform that year focused on Harper’s 
broken pledge, declaring that Harper “did not honour . . . [his] commitments” 
(cited in Koop, 2014). Reflecting Williams’s approach to natural resources, the 
platform further stated that “The days of resource giveaways are gone” and that 
Newfoundlanders were now “masters of our own house.” This latter saying was 
a direct resuscitation Quebec Premier Jean Lesage’s “Maîtres chez nous” cam-
paign slogan in 1962, a phrase that led to the nationalization of that province’s 
electricity sector and paved the way for the Quiet Revolution (Vezina and Basta, 
2014). Williams consequently rode a wave of nationalist popularity, capturing 
70 per cent of the vote and 44 of 48 seats in the House of Assembly (Feehan, 
2011b: 52). Later the resource nationalist crusade continued as Williams led a 
bitter Anything But Conservative (ABC) campaign during the 2008 federal 
election. Williams registered the ABC campaign as a third party under Cana-
da’s election laws, allowing him to purchase full-page newspaper ads and bill-
boards in ontario proclaiming Harper as a leader not to be trusted. Provincially, 
the Premier framed the federal Conservatives’ broken promise “as a betrayal of 
all Newfoundlanders and Labradorians” (Koop, 2014). While he did not 
achieve much success nationally the ABC initiative saw the federal Conserva-
tive Party lose all three of its seats in Newfoundland, slipping to third place in 
voter preference (Feehan, 2011b: 52).
Faced with an inability to reach another political settlement with ottawa, 
Williams turned to maximizing the province’s revenues via an equity stake 
with industry on the development of the Hebron oil field, scheduled to pro-
duce oil in 2017. The vehicle through which Williams would achieve this 
would be a newly reconstituted Crown energy corporation, Nalcor. At the time, 
the consortium of companies involved in the project were in the process of 
constructing a Hibernia-like platform to extract the oil, which is heavier and 
harder to remove and refine than the oil from the other fields off the province. 
At one point, in 2006, the prospects of development were looking dim: the 
consortium had announced they were abandoning the project and claimed 
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that once they had dismantled the development team it would take at least two 
years to restart the project. Premier Williams threatened to pursue fallow field 
legislation, which would up the stakes of the decision to postpone the develop-
ment of the field. The companies would risk losing the right to develop a field 
if they did not develop it within a certain period of time. The main points of 
contention were the province’s demand for an equity stake in the project as 
well as the introduction of a super royalty level that would take effect when oil 
prices were exceptionally high (Sinclair, 2008). This was a move by the prov-
ince to once again impose a Norwegian development model plus a variation of 
the generic royalty regime established earlier with Hibernia (see Harvie, 1994). 
Naturally, this was a model the oil companies vigorously resisted. However, the 
Chevron-led consortium negotiated from a point of weakness, given the al-
ready tight and declining supply of oil combined with an increasingly unstable 
investment climate elsewhere at the time. This combination of factors resulted 
in a development agreement in 2007 where the province seemingly got most of 
what it wanted. The Hebron agreement “had widespread support across the 
province given concerns over unemployment and underdevelopment” (Koop, 
2014). As an aside, the Hebron negotiations would earn Williams the nick-
name “danny Chavez” from the oil industry, after the populist authoritarian 
leader of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, who had nationalized much of that coun-
try’s petroleum industry in the 2000s. 
CoNCLuSIoN
In reviewing the Peckford and Williams premierships it can be said that New-
foundland’s push for autonomy and control over oil resources was largely tem-
pered by what Plourde (2012: 88) notes as the three factors that always impact 
Canadian oil development: geology, demographics (in politics), and constitu-
tional provisions. Still, this did not stop either Peckford or Williams from trying. 
If we take Wilson’s (2010) four goals of resource nationalism as an example, it 
is clear from the Newfoundland experience that the most pertinent goal was to 
capture a greater share of the rents by demanding a stake in the exploitation, 
not outright nationalization. Arguably, this likely was due to the weak fiscal 
position in which the province found itself during the 1980s and again in the 
early 2000s. owing to constitutional losses at both the federal and provincial 
supreme courts, Peckford eventually backtracked from outright control, as he 
had proposed during his tenure at the department of energy, settling on shared 
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jurisdiction over offshore oil with ottawa through the Atlantic Accord. It is 
also arguable that the years of delays generated through constitutional wran-
gling precipitated a desire in Peckford to reach a compromise in order to reduce 
jurisdictional uncertainty and initiate oil production. 
The Accord, and the 2005 offset Agreement negotiated by Williams, al-
lowed the province to receive a portion of the rents ottawa earned in each oil 
field, but with limitations: the federal willingness under both Liberal and Con-
servative governments to cede total revenue-generating power was clearly nev-
er going to be an option. Given such constitutional and political constraints, by 
the time the oil revenues started entering the provincial treasury in the 2000s 
the Williams government moved from increasing Newfoundland’s share of the 
rents via ottawa to actually obtaining a financial stake offshore in the Hebron 
project. This latter point differentiates Williams from Peckford, who largely 
abandoned the goal of having a provincial stake in projects in favour of joint 
management. Williams, on the other hand, resurrected it, especially in estab-
lishing Nalcor, the Crown energy corporation. Nalcor, in many ways, is a re-
vival of Peckford’s pre-Atlantic Accord establishment of the Newfoundland 
Petroleum Corporation (Plourde, 2012: 96, 106).
two of Bremmer and Johnston’s (2009) four variants of resource national-
ism are applicable to the Newfoundland oil case study. While these authors ar-
gue that Newfoundland would fall under the rubric of “soft resource national-
ism,” common in most developed countries, the province is also an example of 
a less extreme variant of “economic resource nationalism.” For instance, both 
Peckford and Williams took the “soft” nationalist approach of appealing for a 
greater share of the rents through royalties, but Williams took an aggressive stand 
against the international consortium on the Hebron oil field, threatening to en-
act fallow field legislation should the province not obtain a stake in the project, 
as well a provision guaranteeing super royalties in the event of high oil prices. 
Peckford, in contrast, was concentrated on fighting the federal government over 
jurisdictional issues — he paid little attention to combating the oil industry. 
What the Newfoundland case potentially means is that resource nationalism in 
developed countries is more nuanced than originally thought.
tellingly, as Vivoda would note, the province’s success in achieving its goals 
during the Hebron negotiations could not have happened without the high 
price of oil (roughly uS$70 a barrel and climbing). under pressure to develop 
more oil fields, the Chevron-led consortium had little choice but to accede to 
the province’s demands. Therefore, the Hebron negotiations illustrate the role 
that obsolescing bargaining has played in the history of Newfoundland’s oil 
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development. As noted in the introduction, when oil prices were low in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, at less than uS$20 a barrel, the government of Premier 
Clyde Wells was stuck bargaining from a weak position with the oil consortium 
developing the Hibernia field. one of the major companies holding a 25 per 
cent stake in the project, Gulf oil, backed out in 1992. Based on this event the 
remaining partners reduced expenditures and work on the project slowed as 
they searched for a new partner. In the end, the intervention of the federal gov-
ernment in combination with the “favourable provincial royalty regime” of the 
Wells government saved the project from complete collapse (Feehan, 2009: 178; 
Mulroney, 2007; Crosbie, 1997). Such a contrasting experience within a two-de-
cade period highlights the cyclical nature found in the bargaining arguments 
made by Ross (2012), Vivoda (2009), and Bremmer and Johnston (2009). More-
over, Newfoundland’s experiences on bargaining from both weak and strong 
positions in such a short period of time also point to the volatility of the oil 
market and to how much favourable royalty agreements are due to global eco-
nomic factors beyond the control of St. John’s. The drop in oil prices in late 2014 
and early 2015 has further highlighted the vulnerabilities of relying on a resource- 
heavy economy, leaving the provincial government with a $916 million budget 
deficit (projected as of december 2014) and in a weakened bargaining position 
for negotiation royalties from future oil deposits, like those recently found in 
the Flemish Pass (Minister of Finance, 2014; CBC, 2014).
Finally, the impact of resource nationalism on Newfoundland’s oil devel-
opment during the Peckford and Williams years illustrates the applicability of 
the theory to other resource issues and disputes. This applicability likely in-
cludes an analysis of the Peckford and Wells approaches to the fishing indus-
try; Brian tobin’s fight with Inco over mineral processing in the province; and 
Williams’s nationalization of Abitibi-Bowater’s hydro and factory assets in 
2008. Likewise, the handling of the Churchill Falls (upper and Lower) file dat-
ing back to the Smallwood years would provide a fascinating case study of how 
successive administrations adopted resource nationalist policies on managing 
this sensitive resource. Again, these topics point to the research potential that 
remains in analyzing resource nationalism in Newfoundland and to the merits 
that lie in researching an understudied case. 
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NoteS
1.  two points for clarification: first, for the sake of simplicity, Newfoundland and Labra-
dor will henceforth be referred to as Newfoundland; second, the analysis will remain 
on Newfoundland’s experience with resource nationalism and nationalism generally.
2.  Stevens explains that when market failure occurred governments used “corrective taxes 
and subsidies, regulation, price controls, planning and ultimately government owner-
ship to balance market imperfections” (2008: 7).
3.  A Supreme Court reference brought about by a dispute between the federal govern-
ment and British Columbia in 1967 over who could constitutionally control offshore 
resources. See Reference Re: Offshore Mineral Rights, [1967] S.C.R. 792.
4.  Following a constitutional amendment in 2001, altering the province’s name to include 
Labrador, the board was renamed the Canada–Newfoundland and Labrador offshore 
Petroleum Board.
WoRKS CIted
Bickerton, James. 2002. “our Place in Canada: Realistic and Restrained, but Lured into Folly 
by the Seduction of oil,” Newfoundland and Labrador Studies 18, 2: 290–98.
———. 2008. “equalization, Regional development, and Political trust: The Section 36/
Atlantic Accord Controversy,” Constitutional Forum 17, 3: 99–111.
Bond, Ross, david McCrone, and Alice Brown. 2003. “National Identity and economic de-
velopment: Reiteration, Recapture, Reinterpretation and Repudiation,” Nations and 
Nationalism 9, 3: 371–91.
Bradbury, John. H. 1982. “State Corporations and Resource Based development in Quebec, 
Canada: 1960–1980,” Economic Geography: 45–61.
Bremmer, Ian, and Robert Johnston. 2009. “The Rise and Fall of Resource Nationalism,” 
Survival 51, 2: 149–58.
Cadigan, Sean t. 2009a. Newfoundland and Labrador: A History. toronto: university of 
toronto Press.
———. 2009b. “Not a Nation! or Why Newfoundland Nationalism doesn’t Make Historical 
Sense,” Newfoundland Quarterly 102, 1: 40–43.
CBC News online. 2014. “N.L. deficit Forecast Jumps to $916M as oil Prices Plunge,” 16 dec.
112  Collins and Reid  
Churchill, Jason. 1999. “Pragmatic Federalism: The Politics behind the 1969 Churchill Falls 
Contract,” Newfoundland and Labrador Studies 15, 2: 215–46.
Collins, Jeffrey. 2012. “executive Federalism and the terms of union: A New Approach to 
understanding the ‘Roads-for-Rails’ and ‘Roads-for-Boats’ Agreements,” Newfound-
land and Labrador Studies 27, 2: 157–78.
Corporate Research Associates. 2012. “NL Government Satisfaction declines Sharply but 
Remains Highest in the Region,” news release, 7 June.
Crosbie, John C. 1997. No Holds Barred: My Life in Politics. toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
domjan, Paul, and Matt Stone. 2010. “A Comparative Study of Resource Nationalism in 
Russia and Kazakhstan 2004–2008,” Europe–Asia Studies 62, 1: 35–62.
expert Panel on equalization and territorial Formula Financing. 2006. Achieving a National 
Purpose: Putting Equalization Back on Track. ottawa: department of Finance, Govern-
ment of Canada.
Feehan, James P. 2009. “equalization: Natural Resources, the Cap, and the offset Payment 
Agreements,” in John R. Allan, Thomas J. Courchene, and Christian Leuprecht, eds., 
Canada: The State of the Federation, eds. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s uni-
versity Press, 175–200.
———. 2011a. “Smallwood, Churchill Falls, and the Power Corridor through Quebec,” Aca-
diensis 40, 2: 112–27.
———. 2011b. “danny Williams Goes out on top,” Policy Options 32, 2: 50–55.
——— and Melvin Baker. 2007. “The origins of a Coming Crisis: Renewal of the Churchill 
Falls Contract,” Dalhousie Law Journal 30: 207–58.
Gilpin, Robert. 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
university Press.
Goldstein, Walter. 1981. “Canada’s Constitutional Crisis: The uncertain development of 
Alberta’s energy Resources,” Energy Policy 9, 1: 4–13.
Gwyn, Richard. 1972. Smallwood: The Unlikely Revolutionary. toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
Harvie, C. 1994. Fool’s Gold: The Story of North Sea Oil. London: Hamish Hamilton.
Helleiner, eric. 2002. “economic Nationalism as a Challenge to economic Liberalism? Les-
sons from the 19th Century,” International Studies Quarterly 46, 3: 307–29.
Higgins, Jenny. 2011. “The Peckford Government 1979–1989,” Newfoundland and Labrador 
Heritage (online). http://www.heritage.nf.ca/law/peckford_gov.html.
Hiller, Harry H. 1987. “dependence and Independence: emergent Nationalism in New-
foundland,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 10, 3: 257–75.
Hiller, James K. 2007. “Robert Bond and the Pink, White, and Green: Newfoundland Nation-
alism in Perspective,” Acadiensis 36, 2: 113–33.
Horwood, Harold. 1989. Joey: The Life and Political Times of Joey Smallwood. toronto: Stoddart.
House, J.d. 1982. “Premier Peckford, Petroleum Policy, and Popular Politics in Newfound-
land and Labrador,” Review of Canadian Studies 17, 2: 12–31.
———. 1985. The Challenge of Oil: Newfoundland’s Quest for Controlled Development. St. 
John’s: Institute of Social and economic Research.
“No More Giveaways!”  113
Karl, t.L. 1997. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. Berkeley: university of 
California Press.
Koop, Royce. 2014. “Parties and Brokerage Politics in Newfoundland and Labrador,” in Alex 
Marland and Matthew Kerby, eds., First among Unequals: The Premier, Politics, and 
Policy in Newfoundland and Labrador. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s uni-
versity Press.
Korneski, Kurt. 2008. “Race, Gender, Class, and Colonial Nationalism: Railway develop-
ment in Newfoundland, 1881–1898,” Labour/Le Travail 62: 79–107.
Library of Parliament. 2006. Equalization: Implications of Recent Changes. ottawa: Govern-
ment of Canada.
Mares, david R. 2010. “Resource Nationalism and energy Security in Latin America: Impli-
cations for Global oil Supplies,” James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice 
university.
Marland, Alex. 2010. “Masters of our own destiny: The Nationalist evolution of New-
foundland Premier danny Williams,” International Journal of Canadian Studies 41: 
155–81.
McAllister, Ian. 1982. “Review Article: Newfoundland: From dependency to Self-Reliance,” 
Canadian Public Policy 8, 1: 122–28.
Minister of Finance. 2014. 2014–15 Fall Update. St. John’s: department of Finance, Govern-
ment of Newfoundland and Labrador.
Mulroney, Brian. 2007. Memoirs. toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
o’dea, Shane. 2003. “Culture and Country: The Role of the Arts and Heritage in the Nation-
alist Revival in Newfoundland,” Newfoundland Studies 19, 2: 378–86.
o’Flaherty, Patrick. 1999. Old Newfoundland: A History to 1843. St. John’s: Long Beach Press.
overton, James. 1979. “towards a Critical Analysis of Neo-Nationalism in Newfoundland,” 
in R.J. Brym and R.J. Sacouman, eds.,Underdevelopment and Social Movements in At-
lantic Canada. toronto: New Hogtown Press.
Plourde, Andre. 2012. “Canada,” in George Anderson, ed., Oil and Gas in Federal Systems. 
toronto: oxford university Press.
Reid, Scott, and Jeffrey F. Collins. 2013. “An Atlantic Canadian Perspective on the NeP,” pa-
per presented at the annual conference of the Canadian Political Science Association, 4 
June, Victoria, BC.
Ross, Michael L. 2012. The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of 
Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton university Press.
Sinclair, P. 2008. An Ill Wind Blowing Some Good: Dispute over Development of the Hebron 
Oilfield off Newfoundland. occasional Paper of the Project, oil, Power and dependency: 
Global and Local Realities of the offshore oil Industry in Newfoundland and Labrador.
Smith, Jennifer. 2005. “Canada: A Noisy Squabble over offshore oil and equalization,” Fed-
erations 4, 3: 19–20.
Stevens, Paul. 2008. “National oil Companies and International oil Companies in the Middle 
east: under the Shadow of Government and the Resource Nationalism Cycle,” Journal 
of World Energy Law and Business 1, 1: 5–30.
114  Collins and Reid  
Thomsen, Robert C. 2010. Nationalism in Stateless Nations: Selves and Others in Scotland and 
Newfoundland. edinburgh: West Newington House.
Vezina, Valerie, and Karlo Basta. 2014. “Nationalism in Newfoundland and Labrador,” in 
Alex Marland and Matthew Kerby, eds., First among Unequals: The Premier, Politics, 
and Policy in Newfoundland and Labrador. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
university Press.
Vivoda, Vlado. 2009. “Resource Nationalism, Bargaining and International oil Companies: 
Challenges and Change in the New Millennium,” New Political Economy 14, 4: 517–34.
Wilson, Jeffrey d. 2010. “Resource Nationalism or Resource Liberalism? explaining the Aus-
tralian Approach to Chinese Investment in Its Minerals Sector,” paper presented at the 
4th oceanic Conference on International Studies.
